Issues
In a criminal case brought under the Hobbes Act, must the United States prove beyond a reasonable doubt that drugs targeted for robbery traveled through interstate commerce or otherwise affected interstate commerce?
The Supreme Court will clarify the interaction between the Hobbs Act of 1948 (“the Hobbs Act”) and Congress’ commerce power over intra-state activity. The Hobbs Act prohibits obstruction or delay of “the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts . . . to do [so].” Petitioner David Anthony Taylor was convicted in federal court for affecting interstate commerce by attempting to rob a marijuana dealer of his “drugs and drug proceeds.” Taylor argues that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his activity had any effect on interstate commerce, and thus he was deprived of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment due process rights. However, the United States contends that the aggregation principle of the Commerce Clause grants federal jurisdiction over the activity as part of a “national market,” even if the stolen drugs remained entirely within one state. Consequently, the United States asserts that the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act is satisfied as a matter-of-law.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
In a federal criminal prosecution under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951: Is the government relieved of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the interstate commerce element by relying exclusively on evidence that the robbery or attempted robbery of a drug dealer is an inherent economic enterprise that satisfies as a matter of law, the interstate commerce element of the offense?
Facts
Roanoke, Virginia experienced a heightened level of crime between 2007 and 2010. See Brief for Petitioner, David Anthony Taylor at 4. Cocaine and marijuana trades enjoyed substantial profitability, leading to an associated increase in drug-related violence and robbery. See Brief for Respondent, United States at 4. Petitioner David Anthony Taylor joined a local gang known as the “Southwest Goonz,” which capitalized on the drug boom by robbing drug dealers. See United States v. Taylor, 754 F.3d 217, 220 (4th Cir. 2014).
On July 26, 2012, Taylor was indicted on two counts under the Hobbs Act of 1946 for attempted robbery affecting commerce, “by attempting to take or obtain marijuana and drug proceeds” from his victims. See Taylor, 754 F.3d at 221; Brief for Respondent at 6–7 (internal quotations omitted). The United States alleged that Taylor, in coordination with other gang members, forcibly entered the home of known drug-dealers with the objective of stealing “pounds of weed.” See Taylor, 754 F.3d at 220–221; Brief for Respondent at 5–6 (internal quotations omitted).
Before trial, the United States sought to block Taylor from arguing that robbery of marijuana produced and exchanged intrastate could not impose liability under the Hobbes Act. See Taylor, F.3d at 221; Brief for Respondent at 7. The Act prohibits individuals from obstructing, delaying, or otherwise affecting “the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts . . . to do [so].” See Taylor, 754 F.3d at 221–22.
The District Court concluded that “drug dealing [inherently] impacts interstate commerce,” and thus a showing of intent to steal marijuana would satisfy the Act’s jurisdictional requirement. See Taylor, F.3d at 221; Brief for Respondent at 7. Subsequently, the jury found Taylor guilty on both counts. See Taylor, 754 F.3d at 221.
Taylor appealed, asserting that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution protected his right “to present evidence and argue that the robbery of a dealer of intrastate grown marijuana did not have an effect on interstate commerce.” See Brief for Petitioner at 8–9; Taylor, 754 F.3d at 221. He alleged that the trial court deprived him of due process by relieving the government of its obligation to prove the jurisdictional element, interstate commerce, beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brief for Petitioner at 8–9; Taylor, 754 F.3d at 221.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Taylor’s conviction. See Taylor, F.3d at 226. Relying on several precedents, the court argued that Congress had clearly expressed its intent in the Hobbs Act to exercise the full extent of its power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. See id. at 222–23. It explained that the commerce power permits federal regulation over an entire class of behavior that has “a measureable impact on interstate commerce” in the aggregate, even if the specific act punished occurred entirely within a single state. See id.; Brief for Respondent at 9–10. The court explained that the Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) affirmed Congress’ authority to regulate the intrastate component of a “national marijuana market” based on aggregate effect. See Taylor, F.3d at 222–26. Consequently, the court concluded that “[b]ecause drug dealing in the aggregate necessarily affects interstate commerce, the government was simply required to prove that Taylor depleted or attempted to deplete the assets of [a drug-dealer’s] operation.” See id. at 224.
Taylor petitioned the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari, which the Court granted on October 1, 2015. See Brief for Petitioner at 1.
Analysis
Taylor and the United States agree that the Hobbs Act contains two primary elements: (1) the jurisdictional element of affecting interstate commerce, and (2) “robbery or extortion.” See Brief for Respondent, United States at 12–13; Brief for Petitioner, David Anthony Taylor at 18–19. If the crime does not affect interstate commerce, then the federal government does not have jurisdiction over the crime. See Brief for Petitioner at 19. The Court will decide whether the United States satisfied the jurisdictional element.
Taylor argues that drug dealing does not per se satisfy the jurisdictional element of affecting interstate commerce. Instead, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that attempting to rob a drug dealer affected interstate commerce. See Brief for Petitioner at 19–20. But the United States contends that the Hobbs Act’s language utilizes broad Congressional authority, and that drug dealing falls into a class of action that per se satisfies the jurisdictional element. See Brief for Respondent at 14, 16, 25.
IS THE JURISDICTION ELEMENT OF THE HOBBS ACT A QUESTION OF LAW OR OF FACT?
Taylor argues that the Hobbs Act “requires [] the government prove that the specific personal property made the subject of the robbery affects commerce.” As such, the facts of each case matter. See Brief for Petitioner at 17. Taylor states that allowing drug-dealer robberies to satisfy per se the jurisdictional element without examining the circumstances of each case violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment due process rights. See id. at 19. Under Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), the Fifth Amendment requires the prosecution to “persuade the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt of the facts necessary to establish each” element of the crime. See id. at 19, 21. Taylor contends that allowing the per se ruling relieves the government of this duty and thus violates the defendant’s rights. See id. at 19.
The United States contends that Taylor mischaracterizes the jurisdictional element as a question of fact. See Brief for Respondent at 29–30. Rather, the United States argues that the jurisdictional element constitutes a matter-of-law in drug cases, and that allowing the jury to determine the affect on interstate commerce in cases involving drug dealers would improperly allow the jury to decide law. See id. at 30. The United States maintains that the attempted robbery of drug dealers falls under its Commerce Clause jurisdiction. See id. at 16. The text of the Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional element uses “expansive statutory language that unambiguously applies the full extent of Congress’s commerce power to prohibit extortion and robbery.” See id. at 16 (internal citation omitted). The Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate both inter- and intrastate activities that “nevertheless substantially affect interstate commerce.” See id. at 17. Consequently, the United States concludes that under the aggregation principle, attempted robbery of marijuana falls under both: marijuana is a “fungible commodity” with an established and illicit interstate market, and local activity significantly affecting interstate activity. See id. at 17–19.
By comparison, the United States argues that the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) does not have a jurisdictional element. “Congress enacted the CSA to ‘control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.’” See Brief for Respondent at 25. As such, the United States maintains that “Congress specifically found that controlled substances manufactured and distributed ‘intrastate cannot be differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate.’” See id.. Moreover, the United States further claims that the CSA provides federal jurisdiction over the marijuana trade. See id. at 26–27. Because the attempted robbery of marijuana will necessarily affect the marijuana trade and movement of commodities, the United States argues that there is no discernible exclusivity between the CSA and Hobbs Act. See id.
Although the CSA may provide federal jurisdiction over intrastate marijuana, Taylor contends that the CSA alone “does not lead to the conclusion that drug-related robberies are subject to federal jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act.” See Brief for Petitioner at 24. Taylor states there is a clear difference between an act that regulates the drug trade and one that regulates robbery and extortion. See id.
Was the evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction?
Taylor states that he was prevented from making a complete defense in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights because he could not present facts suggesting the marijuana in question was grown intrastate. See Brief for Petitioner at 20, 27. The United States contends that even under Taylor’s analysis, “evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that [Taylor] targeted marijuana dealers dealing in out-of-state marijuana.” See Brief for Respondent at 35, 37. For instance, the Roanoke drug trade was widely known for its “exotic” marijuana. See id. at 35-36. The United States contends that logically, the exotic marijuana “ha[d] been bred to have . . . a high concentration of ‘the active ingredient in marijuana,’” so “would likely have been produced by specialized growers located in a State or foreign country with a favorable climate.” See id.
How should prior case law be assessed?
In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), the Court affirmed Congress’ ability to regulate intrastate drug trade that, in the aggregate, affected interstate commerce. Taylor and the United States interpret the case differently.
Taylor argues that there should be an “individualized assessment of the facts surrounding the attempted extortion” to determine federal jurisdiction “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brief for Petitioner at 21–22. Taylor maintains that Raich “did not create a Commerce Clause exception for drugs,” even if “Congress [was given] the authority to regulate intra-state grown marijuana.” See id. at 23. Moreover, Taylor contends that the Fourth Circuit’s ruling conflicts with the Second Circuit’s and Seventh Circuit’s, both of whom take the “individualized assessment” approach. See id. at 21.
The United States contends that Raich stands for the proposition that the Court uses “practical economics based on common sense and logic to evaluate a regulated activity’s likely effect on interstate commerce.” See Brief for Respondent at 20. The drug dealing in this case is “quintessentially economic.” See id. at 18. Marijuana has “an established, albeit illegal, interstate market,” and taken in aggregate would affect the national market without federal control. See id. at 18-19.
Conclusion
This case will clarify the regulation of drug dealing and the interaction between intrastate activity and interstate commerce. Taylor suggests that the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act constitutes a factual question left to a jury’s determination following a complete presentation of the facts. See id. at 17, 19, 21. The United States asserts that the jurisdictional element is a question of law. SeeBrief for Respondent at 29-30.